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RECENT CASES
34 would require that the statement of facts be filed within ninety days after the enti-y
of judgment even though a motion for a new trial was pending and was not determined
until after the expiration of the ninety days. Should the motion be denied, unless the
appellant has filed his statement of facts before the ruling, he would find himself with
a right of appeal, given under Rule 33(5), but 'with no right to present his statement
of facts. Consequently, he would have little hope of a favorable decision, since in the
absence of a statement of facts, the Supreme Court refuses to rule on assignments of
errors whichdo not appear on the face of the record. Lilly Co. v. Parrino, 18 Wn. 2d
128, 138 P. 2d 206 (1943) ; Wheatley v. Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wn. 2d 163, 234
P. 2d 878 (1951). On the other hand, if, fearing such an eventuality, he had proceeded
to file his statement and later the motion for a new trial was granted, he would have
been put to useless trouble and expense.
In view of these possibilities, the holding of the instant case, insofar as it dates the
time for taking an appeal and the time for filing the statement of facts from the same
event, seems only reasonable. Its apparent conflict with the wording of Rule 34 is miti-
gated if the reasoning of the court in Reeves v. Wilson, 105. Wash. 318, 177 Pac. 825
(1919) is applied: "The motion for a new trial suspends the effect of the judgment until
after the determination of the motion and filing of the order denying the motion." In
other words, the judgment does not become final until the motion is determined.
While consistent with dicta in cases decided under the rule in effect from 1938
until the present rules were adopted in 1951, the decision in the Dunseath case embodies
the first direct holding reconciling the present rules. Since the time for filing had
expired, statements in the earlier cases to the effect that the time should be computed
from the denial of the motion for a new trial were not decisive of any issue presented
therein. See Lilly Co. v. Parrino, supra; State ex rel Grange Store v. Riddell, 27 Wn.
2d 134, 177 P. 2d 78 (1947) ; Wheeler v. Birch & Sons Const. Co., supra.
The language of the present holding may raise a question as to the status of a
party whose motion for a new trial has been .denied, but against whom judgment has
not been entered. However, since an order denying a motion for a new trial is not
appealable, it is unlikely that the court would interpret its ruling in the Dunseath case
to mean that the appellant must file his statement of facts within ninety days after the
denial of such a motion when there exists no judgment or order from which he can
take an appeal.
In view of the holding, is an appeal premature if it is taken after entry of final
judgment but before the denial of the motion for a new trial? Conceivably a respond-
ent could be harmed if he had expended the effort necessary to prepare his brief, and
the new trial was subsequently granted. However, if the appellant is allowed to wait
until after the determination of his motion before taking his appeal, the probability of
such an occurrence is not as great as it would be if he were required to carry it through
from the date of entry of judgment. The question is not discussed in the main case;
rather D's earlier appeal is "treated as abandoned." Presumably an appeal taken before
denial of a motion for a new trial is not untimely.
JOANNE BALEY
Income Tax-Deductibility of Legal Expenses. P made a gift of 1,000 shares of stock
to members of his family and paid the federal gift tax thereon. Thereafter P was noti-
fied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of a gift tax deficiency of $145,276.50.
Through his attorney, P secured a settlement of the deficiency for $15,612.75. He did
not deduct the legal expenses of the gift tax controversy from his gross income but
later claimed an income tax refund on the ground that the legal fee should have been
deducted under INT. Rxv. CODE § 23 (a) (2). The District Court held for P. The Court
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of Appeals reversed. On certiorari, Held: affirmed. The non-deductibility of such
expenditures is indicated both by the absence of any affirmative allowance of their
deductibility under INT. Rav. CODE § 23 (a) (2) and the express denial of the deducti-
bility of all personal and family expenses under INT. Rav. CODE § 24(a) (1). Lykes v.
United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
Taxpayers are permitted under INT. REv. CODE § 23(a) (1) to deduct from gross
income the ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on any trade or business. As
a result of the narrow interpretation of the words "trade or business," particularly in
Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), the deductions permitted by §
23(a) (1) were not available to taxpayers, such as investors who, although taxable on
income derived from investments, were not engaged in a trade or business. Congress
recognized that this result was inequitable as to such taxpayers and enacted the present
§ 23(a) (2) to correct that inequity. H. R. RP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46
(1942). § 23(a) (2) provides for the deduction of ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conserva-
tion, or maintenance of property held for the production of income. The Congressional
discussion of the present § 23(a) (2) indicates that it was intended to permit the deduc-
tion of those non-trade or non-business expenses neither permitted as deductions by
§ 23 as it then existed nor prohibited as deductions by § 24. Rep. Disney in 88 CONG.
Rac. 6376 (1942).
The first Treasury Regulation interpreting § 23(a) (2) stated that legal expenses
incurred by a taxpayer in tax litigation were not deductible expenses under that sec-
tion. U. S. TaEAs. REo. 111, § 2923(a)-15(b) (1943). The United States Supreme
Court, however, took a more liberal view in Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner, 325
U.S. 365 (1945), where it was held that a taxpayer was entitled under § 23(a) (2) to
deduct legal expenses paid in contesting an income tax deficiency. Following that
decision, the Treasury Regnlation was amended by T.D. 5513, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 61,
which expressly recognized the deductibility of legal expenses incurred in the determi-
nation of income tax liability and of liability for property taxes upon property held
for the production of income. The same Treasury Decision further provided that legal
expenses incurred in the determination of liability for other taxes were not deductible.
The non-deductibility of legal expenses incurred in connection with such other taxes
has been recognized by the courts. Cobb v. Commissioner, 173 F. 2d 711 (C.A. 6th
1949), Cert. denied, 338 U.S. 832 (1948) (gift tax) ; Edmunds v. United States, 71 F.
Supp. 29 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (estate tax).
The basis of the distinction between those taxes giving rise to legal expenses which
may be deducted under § 23(a) (2) and those taxes giving rise to legal expenses which
may not be deducted under that section is suggested in the Bingham case. There the
court first considers the deductibility of an expense under § 23(a) (1) and states that
an expense is not deductible under that section unless it proximately results from the
conduct of the business. The conduct of a business is an activity expressly within
§ 23 (a) (1). The court then holds that the deductibility of a non-trade or non-business
expense under § 23(a) (2) is to be determined in the same manner. Following this
reasoning, an expense is not deductible under § 23(a) (2) unless it is directly con-
nected with or proximately results from the conduct of an activity within that section.
Basically the same test is announced in the instant case where the court holds that
the deductibility of the legal expenses there involved turns wholly upon the nature of
the activities to which those expenses relate. The court then finds that the making of
gifts is not an activity which is contemplated by any of the terms of § 23(a) (2). In
conrast, the litigation of income tax liability is within the area of action comprehended
by the words "collection of income."
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The argument for the deductibility of the legal expense in the instant case is that
the gift tax deficiency, if uncontested, would have consumed property held by the
taxpayer for the production of income, hence the legal expense was for the conserva-
tion of property held for the production of income. This approach does not consider
the nature of the activity to which the expense relates but considers only the result of
incurring the expense. The legal expenses incurred in defending any claim which
could be asserted against a taxpayer would be expenses for the conservation of the
taxpayer's property, hence, following this approach, all legal expenses would be
deductible. It is submitted that this goes far beyond the intent of Congress in the
enactment of § 23 (a) (2) and that the preferable result is that reached in the instant
case.
In the recent case of Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 646 (C.A. 8th 1952), it was
held that a taxpayer's legal expenses incurred in arranging a property settlement fol-
lowing the taxpayer's divorce were deductible expenses under § 23 (a) (2). There the
court considers the Lykes case as clearly a family transaction.which had nothing to do
with the conservation or maintenance of property held by the taxpayer for income
producing purposes. The legal expenses in the Baer case are distinguished as being
directed to the conservation and maintenance of property held by the taxpayer for
income producing purposes. It is submitted that the majority there adopts the approach
unsuccessfully urged in the Lykes case and, as the dissent points out, the two cases
should turn on the same principle. The Baer case indicates an apparent lack of sym-
pathy with the interpretation of § 23(a) (2) employed in the Bingham and Lykes
cases. Conceding that it may be inequitable to forbid the deduction of legal expenses
such as those incurred by Baer and by Lykes, the remedy should come from further
amendment of the Internal Revenue Code by Congress, not an unwarranted interpreta-
tion thereof by the courts.
WILLIAM S. SrnNmN
Income Tax-Funds Received by Extortion as Income. T was an associate of X
during prohibition when they were bootlegging liquor. After the partnership split up,
T demanded money from X. When T threatened the lives of X and his family, X paid
T $250,000. Held: The extorted funds are taxable to T as income since they were ob-
tained under a "semblance of a bona fide claim of right" and in effect, without oblga-
tion to repay since X was not likely ever to press demand for a return of the money.
Ruthin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
In 1916 the word "lawful" was omitted from the then existing definition of net
income in section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Since that time there has been
a constant stream of cases determining which income resulting from unlawful activi-
ties may be taxable and which may not. On the one hand are the cases which hold the
funds not taxable since it is like a loan due to the obligation to repay the owner,
Wilcox V. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 933 (C.A. 9th 1945) (embezzlement) ; McKnight
v. Commissioner, 127 F. 2d 572 (C.A. 5th 1942) (embezzlement). On the other hand,
there are the cases in which the funds are held taxable because they were received
under a claim of right, U.S. v. Currier Lumber Co., 70 F. Supp. 219 (App. D.C. 1947)
(majority stockholder theft of company checks) ; Kurrie v. Helvering, 126 F. 2d 723
(C.A. 8th 1942) (profits from embezzled funds) ; Moore v. Thomas, 131 F. 2d 611
(C.A. 5th 1942) (excessive fees charged); Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. 2d 122 (App.
D.C. 1937) (usurious interest) ; North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S.
417 (1932) (litigated funds); or because legal title had been passed by the owner
having given over the funds "voluntarily" although by reason of fraud, Akers v. Sco-
field, 167 F. 2d 718 (C.A. 5th 1948) (swindling); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125
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